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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case: 
This is a divorce case which resulted in a trial before the Magistrate and 
the issue on appeal is the characterization of real property acquired during the 
marriage. 
B. Course of Proceedings Below: 
The Magistrate ruled the real property in question was community property 
and that Husband had a right of reimbursement to his separate estate for the full 
amount of the purchase price. The Husband appealed to the District Court. The 
District Court reversed the Magistrate's conclusions of law because the source of 
the funds to entirely purchase the real property were the Husband's separate 
property, and ruled the Subject Property was the Husband's separate property. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts: 
Plaintiff-Respondent, STANLEY KRAL Y, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Husband"), was married to Defendant-Appellant, SUSAN KRAL Y, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Wife"), on April 12, 2003 in Stuart, Florida. Husband sold his 
separate property (owned and paid for prior to the marriage) in Palm City, Florida 
netting proceeds of $536, 659.31. The real property was his primary residence 
prior to his marriage with Wife. Husband used the proceeds from the sale of his 
separate home for the purchase of a parcel of unimproved 60 acres of real 
property near Rapid Lightning Creek, Idaho (hereinafter the "Subject Property"). 
The Subject Property is listed as Item #3 on the Inventory of Property submitted 
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at Trial as Court's Exhibit No. 1. The purchase price for the Subject Property 
was $167,500 and Husband used $167,500 from his separate property for the 
entire purchase of the Subject Property. No other payments or improvements 
were made on the Subject Property. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Magistrate err in characterizing the Subject Property as 
community property? 
2. Did the Husband gift or agree to transfer the Subject Property to the 
Wife? 
3. Can the Parole Evidence Rule be used upon appeal to exclude 
evidence surrounding Husband's purchase of the Subject Property? 
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ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's review of a magistrate's decision is made independently from, 
but with due regard for, the decision of a district court sitting in an appellate 
capacity. Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 391 (Ct.App. 2001); Worzala v. 
Worzala, 128 Idaho 408,411 (1996); Smith v. Smith, 124 Idaho 431,436 (1993); 
McAffee v. McAffee, 132 Idaho 281, 284 (Ct.App. 1999). 
The magistrate's findings of fact will be upheld if supported by substantial 
and competent evidence. Worzala, 128 Idaho at 411; Smith, 124 Idaho at 436; 
McAffee, 132 Idaho at 284. 
The manner and method of acquisition of property, as well as the parties' 
treatment of that property, are questions of fact. The Court should defer to the 
magistrate's findings on these issues only when they are supported by 
substantial evidence. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571, 573-74 (Ct.App. 1988). 
However, the characterization of an asset as separate or community, is a 
question of law over which the Court exercises .free review. Batra v. Batra, 135 
Idaho 388, 391 (Ct.App. 2001). 
A. The Character of Property is Determined at the Time of Acquisition: The 
Inception of Title Doctrine. 
Idaho follows the "Inception of Title Doctrine", meaning that the character 
or nature of property acquired during the marriage as community or separate 
property is established and vests at the time of acquisition and cannot be 
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changed. Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 8.49 (1976); Lang v. Lang, 109 
Idaho 805 (Ct. App. 1985); Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811,814 (1983); Batra v. 
Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 397 (Ct. App. 2001). 
The practical effect of the Inception of Title Doctrine is that once the 
character of property is determined, such character remains the same, 
regardless of the improvements, indebtedness, or other expenditures on the 
property by the community. 
"Confusion has arisen in this area because some courts 
have allowed the source of subsequent payments to 
determine the character of the property. This is inconsistent 
with the rule that character of property vests at the time of 
acquisition and we reject it as having any bearing upon the 
nature of the property" 
Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811,816, fn.1 (1983) 
For example, in Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026 (Ct. App. 1985), the 
husband argued that real property acquired by the wife just prior to the marriage 
was completely paid for with community funds. Due to the Inception of Title 
Doctrine the Court in Pringle rejected the argument that community expenditures 
after the purchase of the property could change the character of the property, 
stating: 
"If proceeds from a sale of separate property are used to 
acquire other property, the acquired property also is 
separate in character. I.C., § 32-903; Travelers Insurance 
Co. v. Johnson, 97 Idaho 336, 544 P.2d 294 (1975)." 
Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho at 1027 (citations in original). 
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B. The Character of Property is Dependent on the Source of the Funds Used 
to Acquire the Property, not the Way in Which Title is Held: The Source 
Doctrine. 
Under Idaho's community property analysis, the source of funds used in 
the acquisition of.Property determines the character of property acquired during 
the marriage This is called the "Source Doctrine". Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 
460, 463 (1968). Reference to the title or the names in which the property is held 
is not dispositive of the character of the property. 
For example, most retirement accounts are held only in the employee's 
name, but retirement earnings during the marriage are generally characterized as 
community property. Similarly, if the community purchases real property during 
the marriage, but it is titled in only one spouse's name, the character of the 
property is not necessarily changed to the separate property of the one spouse 
on title. 
Another example would be when one spouse commingles separate 
property into a joint bank account owned by both spouses. The commingling 
alone does not transmute the property to the community, because through 
tracing the separate nature of the funds may be proven. 
Idaho Code § 32-903 provides as follows: 
"All property of either the husband or the wife owned by him 
or her before marriage, and that acquired afterward by either 
by gift, bequest, devise or descent, or that which either he or 
she shall acquire with the proceeds of his or her separate 
property, by way of monies or other property, shall remain 
his or her sole and separate property". (emphasis added) 
Idaho Code§ 32-906(1) follows: 
All other property acquired after marriage by either husband 
or wife is community property. The income, including the 
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rents, issues and profits, of all property, separate or 
community, is community property unless the conveyance by 
which it is acquired provides or both spouses, by written 
agreement specifically so providing, declare that all or 
specifically designated property and the income, including 
the rents, issues and profits, from all or the specifically 
designated property shall be the separate property of one of 
the spouses or the income, including the rents, issues and 
profits, from all or specifically designated separate property 
be the separate property of the spouse to whom the property 
belongs. Such property shall be subject to the management 
of the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for 
the debts of the other member of the community." (emphasis 
added) 
The very opening idea of I.C. § 32-906(1) is "All other property". The aim 
is clearly at the remaining property not addressed by Idaho Code § 32-903. The 
presumption under Idaho Code § 32-906(1) that property acquired during a 
marriage is community in nature only follows after this distinction. 
In Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460 (1968) the issue concerned real 
property purchased during the marriage by contract in the name of both spouses. 
In affirming the trial court's holding that the separate funds of the husband 
purchased the real property, the Court stated: 
"While the court recognizes the presumption that all property 
acquired by spouses during coverture is community 
property, that presumption is rebuttable "when the source of 
the property can be established with reasonable certainty 
and particularity as the separate property of one or the other 
[spouses]***and the property so traced retains its character 
as separate property. Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794 at p. 797 
(and numerous cases cited therein for that proposition), 430 
P.2d 685,688 (1967)." 
Cargill at 464. 
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The Court in Cargill also stated: 
"In Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., Ltd., 21 Idaho 340, 121 P. 
775 (1912), the wife made a down payment (27% of the 
purchase price) from her own separate funds on a certain 
piece of realty and thereafter assumed a first mortgage and 
second mortgage on said tract, the second mortgage and 
two promissory notes being signed by both the husband and 
wife. The court there held that no community interest was 
created in favor of the husband where he had not expended 
any of his separate funds or any community funds in 
payment of the purchase price. The mere fact that the 
husband co-signed the mortgage and notes did not create a 
community interest until and to the extent that it could be 
shown the community had contributed to the purchase of the 
land." 
Cagill at 464. 
This principle was also affirmed in Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811 (1983) 
where the Court stated: 
" ... [T]he property or thing acquired partakes of the same nature as the 
property or funds used to acquire it, de Funiak & Vaughn, Principles of 
Community Property, § 77 (2d ed. 1971) or otherwise stated: [t]he crucial 
question in determining the status of ... property is the source of the funds 
with which it was purchased", Rose v. Rose, 82 Idaho 395, 399, 353 P.2d 
1089 (1960); accord Stanger v. Stanger, supra; in re Estate of Cook, 96 
Idaho 48, 524 P.2d 176 (1974); Cargill v. Hancock, 92 Idaho 460, 444 
P.2d 421 (1968); Stewart v. Weiser Lumber Co., Ltd., 21 Idaho 340, 121 
P. 775 (1912). Accordingly, the rule proceeds, when separate property is 
used to acquire an asset, that asset becomes the separate property of the 
acquiring spouse. Idaho Code §32-903." 
Winn, 105 at 813. 
In Stanger v. Stanger, 98 Idaho 725 (1977), the Court held that the fact 
that real property was acquired in the name of the husband alone did not make it 
separate property. The Court directed the trial court to look to the source of the 
funds used to acquire the property. 
"The status of property acquired during marriage is 
determined by the funds with which it is purchased. Cargill 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 8 
v. Hanock, 92 Idaho 460, 444 P.2d 42 (1968). The fact that 
the husband was named as the only grantee in the deed and 
the only obliger named in the annuity contract is immaterial 
in determining the status of the property. 
Stanger at 728 ( emphasis added). 
In Stanger, the property was partly a gift to the husband and partly 
acquired through a community obligation, therefore, the property had a mixed 
characterization. 
This holding has been repeatedly followed and restated: "If an asset 
purchased during the marriage is purchased with separate property, that asset 
becomes the separate property of the acquiring spouse." Worzala v. Worzala, 
128 Idaho 408,412 (1996). 
"The general rules governing this issue are well known. The 
character of the property vests at the time of its acquisition 
(cite omitted). If proceeds from a sale of separate property 
are used to acquire other property, the acquired property 
also is separate in character." 
Batra v. Batra, 135 Idaho 388, 397 (Ct. App. 2001). 
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the Subject Property was acquired 
with the sole and separate funds of the Husband. Therefore, pursuant to the 
Source Doctrine, this property should be characterized as the separate property 
of Husband. 
C. The Reimbursement Analysis. 
In the case at hand, Husband does not contend that Wife has no possible 
interest in the Subject Property. If there were community efforts or expenditures 
subsequent to acquisition of the Subject Property, the community estate could 
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have a claim for reimbursement under Idaho law. However, the measure of 
reimbursement is the enhancement of value resulting from the expenditure of 
such community funds or community efforts. 
"[W]hen the community efforts, labor, industry, or funds 
enhance the value of separate property, such enhancement 
is community property for which the community is entitled to 
reimbursement. The measure of reimbursement. .. is the 
increase in value of the property ... not the amount or value of 
the community contribution." 
Martsch v. Martsch, 103 Idaho 142, 147 (1982). 
The community may also have a claim of reimbursement if the community 
makes payments to reduce the principal of the Subject Property's indebtedness. 
Pringle v. Pringle, 109 Idaho 1026, 1027 (Ct. App. 1985). This is inapplicable in 
this instance since the Subject Property was purchased free of any 
encumbrance. 
The character of the Subject Property was established as the Husband's 
separate property on the date of acquisition. Wife may claim an interest through 
the right of reimbursement of the subsequent enhancement in value due to the 
community efforts and expenditures or reduction of principal indebtedness. In 
this case, there is no evidence of any community efforts, labor, or funds to 
improve the Subject Property. The only evidence is that any enhancement in 
value is due to natural passive appreciation (Tr. pp. 102-103 "by virtue of it laying 
there"). Wife presented no evidence supporting either claim for reimbursement. 
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D. The Deed Does Not Prevent Husband from Demonstrating the Subject 
Property was Acquired with his Separate Property. 
In the case at hand the subject deed makes no mention of the character of 
the Subject Property. It does not state that it is community property. If the deed 
would have been in Husband's sole name and recited the property was his sole 
and separate property, it would not change the analysis herein. "The definitions 
of community and separate property are found in the Idaho Code." Stanger v. 
Stanger, 98 Idaho 725, 727 (1977). As stated above, according to the Idaho 
Code all other property acquired during the marriage, regardless of how title is 
held, is presumed to be community property. The deed to Husband and Wife is 
not a statement as to the character of the Subject Property. The deed in this 
case makes no expression as to the character. It does not state that the Subject 
Property is "community property of the parties" or that it is the "sole and separate 
property of Husband". The deed was prepared by the third-party granters or 
closing agents who, we can assume, do not purport to know the character of the 
Subject Property. This deed alone cannot transmute the character of the 
property. 
In Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811 (1983), the real property in question was 
titled in both spouses' names by a deed. Id. at 813. However, the Court also 
examined several other factors besides the deed (the value of the down payment 
and who signed the documents of indebtedness) as some of the factors relevant 
in determining the character of the credit by which the loan was obtained. Id. at 
815. 
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In the trial transcript in this matter, the Magistrate confirms the Husband's 
argument that the deed is not a controlling document in the legal analysis: 
"this asset [the Subject Property] stands in a slightly different 
position because unlike everything else which - which never 
was transferred in terms of title - titled ownership to Miss 
Kraly, this one was. This one is deeded in both parties 
names. Now, let me back up a little. The fact that it's 
deeded in both parties names does not answer the question 
under the - under the law. Indeed we often have situations 
where one spouse during a marriage with community funds 
acquires a vehicle or a piece of property, puts it only in his or 
her name and actually thinks that that's gonna matter. It 
doesn't. It's still community property even though the other 
spouse's name is not on it. In this case this is a piece of 
community property. We know that because it was acquired 
during the marriage. So it's community property. The only 
issue is - well, we have a couple issues, actually. One is 
undisputed in the evidence as far as I'm concerned and that 
is the source of the funding. The source of the funding to 
purchase this property was clearly and undisputably from Mr. 
Kraly's realization of proceeds of over half a million dollars 
for the sale of his Florida home, along with other separate 
assets that over time at various times went into that - that 
account which is Exhibit 3. So the property was bought with 
separate money." 
(Tr. p. 177 L. 1 to p.178 L. 2). 
In this case, the deed is not from Husband to Wife and therefore, does not 
raise any presumptions under Idaho Code § 32-906(2): 
"Property conveyed by one spouse to the other shall be 
presumed to be the sole and separate estate of the grantee 
and only the granter spouse need execute and acknowledge 
the deed or other instrument of conveyance notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 32-912, Idaho Code; provided, 
however, that the income, including the rents, issues and 
profits, from such property shall not be the separate property 
of the grantee spouse unless this fact is specifically stated in 
the instrument of conveyance." 
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Nothing in the deed alone contravenes the application of Idaho Code § 32-
903 and the cases cited above, that the Subject Property is the separate property 
of Husband. 
E. The Undisputed Evidence Overcomes the Presumption of Community 
Property. 
Husband acknowledges that, under Idaho law there is a presumption that 
all "other property" acquired during the marriage is community property according 
to Idaho Code§ 32-906(1). 
It is noteworthy that such presumption would apply to the Subject Property 
regardless of whether the deed contained Wife's name or not, as the property 
was acquired during the marriage. It is Husband's burden to overcome that 
presumption. 
"It is recognized that there is a presumption that all property 
acquired by the spouses during coverture is community 
property; Brockelbank, Community Property Law of Idaho 
(1962), pp. 123-24; however, when the source of the 
property can be established with reasonable certainty and 
particularity as the separate property of one or the other, the 
effect of such presumption is overcome, and the property so 
traced retains its character as separate property." 
Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 797 (1967). 
The law in Idaho is unequivocal in holding that property purchased with 
separate funds of a spouse fully overcomes such presumption. 
"The presumption that property acquired during marriage is 
community is controlling only when it is impossible to trace 
the source of the specific property" 
Stahl at 798. 
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There is no case in Idaho that holds that Idaho Code § 32-903 does not 
apply if the property acquired with the separate proceeds of one spouse is placed 
in the names of both spouses by a third-party grantor or title company. 
In this case, the source of funds has been established with complete 
certainty. The Magistrate found that Husband established by direct and exact 
tracing that all the funds used to acquire the Subject Property were his separate 
funds. Wife does not dispute the source of funds. 
F. The Mortgage of Property does not Change the Character of the 
Property. 
Execution of a document by both parties, like a mortgage or 
encumbrance, does not change the character of the property. The Court in 
Shumway v. Shumway, 106 Idaho 415 (1984) stated: 
"In regard to appellant's contention that the signing of a 
mortgage (the proceeds of which were used to build the 
home in which the parties lived) and leases evidence the fact 
that the property was part of the community, we hold that the 
mere signing of the mortgage and leases by appellant does 
not constitute such clear evidence of the community's 
ownership of the farm land that we are required to reverse 
the trial court's finding of fact. Furthermore, having 
determined that the interest in the land was respondent's 
separate property, the mere signing of the mortgage did not 
create a community interest. See Cargill v. Hancock, 92 
Idaho 460, 444 P.2d 421 (1968); Stewart v. Weiser Lumber 
Co., 21 Idaho 340, 121 P. 775 (1912)." 
Shumway, 106 Idaho at 420. 
In this case, Wife passively received a document with her name on it, the 
Warranty Deed. There was no consideration paid by the Wife in exchange for the 
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deed. This deed does not transmute the real property or change its character. 
There was no other evidence tending to prove any community interest in the 
Subject Property or any agreement between the parties. The sole document 
supporting Wife's position in this appeal is the deed. The deed is not clear and 
convincing evidence of an agreement between the parties, pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 32-906(2). The document standing alone could not alter the character of 
the Subject Property. 
G. As a Matter of Law, Husband did not Gift the Subject Property to Wife. 
Wife contends that Husband somehow gifted the Subject Property to her 
such that the Subject Property became the community property of the parties. 
Wife must prove such a gift by clear and convincing evidence. It has been held 
in Idaho that such gifts cannot be accomplished through oral statements or 
circumstance. The Court in Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870 (Ct. App. 
1982) reviewed a factual situation where the wife had a home prior to the 
marriage. Her home was sold and both parties signed the contract to sell the 
home and the closing statements. A new home was purchased with the 
proceeds. During the ownership of the first home, the wife had written to the 
mortgage lender and asked that the husband's name be added to the mortgage 
and payment coupons. During the divorce proceedings, the husband contended 
that any separate interest the wife had in the prior home was transmuted to 
community property because of these circumstances. After an extensive review 
of the law of Idaho, California and other states, the Court in Stockdale stated: 
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"This statutory framework sets our state apart from the other 
jurisdictions where the courts have embraced oral or 
informal transmutation. Idaho Code § 32-916, before 
amendment, and sections 32-917 through 32-919, have 
California counterparts in former California Civil Code §§ 
178-181 (reen. §§ 5133-36). However, these California 
statutes have been tempered by former sections 158 and 
159, discussed above, from which the doctrine of oral or 
informal transmutation was derived .. In Idaho, our restrictive 
statutes have not been tempered by other provisions. They 
stand alone, and the policy they embody has been 
reaffirmed by the 1980 amendments to I.C. §§ 32-906 and 
32-916. We defer to this recent reaffirmation of Idaho 
legislative policy. We hold that the separate or community 
character of real property may be altered only in the manner 
provided or permitted by statute." 
Stockdale, 102 Idaho at 873. 
The Stockdale Court held that, as a matter of law, no transmutation 
occurred and no transmutation was possible for real property absent compliance 
with the applicable provisions of the Idaho Code. The Idaho Court continues to 
hold that there is a very high standard to meet to demonstrate a gift or that there 
has been a transmutation of separate property. See Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 
139 Idaho 448, 459 (2003) (held quitclaim deed to wife did not satisfy statutory 
requirements sufficient to transmute property from separate to community). 
The statutory formalities are as follows: 
"32-917. Formalities required of marriage settlements. - All 
contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing, and executed and 
acknowledged or proved in like manner as conveyances of land are 
required to be executed and acknowledged or proved." 
"32-918. Marriage settlements - Record. - (1) When such contract 
is acknowledged or proved, It must be recorded in the office of the 
recorder of every county in which any real estate may be situated which is 
granted or affected by such contract. 
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(2)(a) A summary of the contract may be recorded in lieu of the 
contract, under this chapter or the laws of this state, if the requirements of 
this section are substantially met. 
(b) A summary of the contract shall be signed and acknowledged by all 
parties to the original contract. The summary of the contract shall clearly 
state: 
The names of the parties to the original contract; 
(i) The complete mailing address of all parties; 
(ii) The title and date of the contract; 
(iii) A description of the interest or interests in real 
property created by the contract; and 
(iv) The legal description of the property. 
(c) Other elements of the contract may be stated in the summary. 
(3)If the requirements of this section are met, the summary of the 
contract may be recorded under the provisions of this chapter and, as to 
the contents of the summary only, it shall have the same force and effect 
as if the original contract had been recorded, and constructive notice shall 
be deemed to be given concerning the contents of the summary and the 
existence of the contract to any subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, or 
other persons or entities that acquire an interest in the real property." 
"32-919 Marriage settlements - Effect of record. - The recording or 
nonrecording of such contract has a like effect as the recording or 
nonrecording of a conveyance of real property." 
Where the wife asserts that a husband intended to transmute property or 
to make a gift, burden is on the wife to prove such intent by clear and convincing 
evidence, and in this case she has failed to meet that burden of proof. Ustick v. 
Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 222 (Ct.App. 1983). 
Therefore, Wife cannot, as a matter of law, show a gift or a transmutation 
of Husband's separate interest in the Subject Property or a written and 
acknowledged agreement, as provided in Idaho Code§§ 32-917 through 32-919. 
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H. The Deed Alone is Insufficient to Transmute the Subject Property. 
In Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448 (2003), the husband and wife 
exchanged quitclaim deeds regarding husband's separate property including a 
quitclaim deed from husband to "husband arid wife". Id. at 459. 
The Court Stated: 
"[A]lthough husband and wife may elect at any time to 
change their property rights, they must engage in certain 
formalities." Wolford v. Wolford, 117 Idaho 61, 66, 785 P.2d 
625, 630 (1990) (quoting Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 
870, 873, 643 P.2d 82, 85 (Ct. App. 1985). Idaho Code§ 
32-917 prescribes the requisite formalities as follows: "All 
contracts for marriage settlements must be in writing. and 
executed and acknowledged or proved in like manner as 
conveyances of land are required to be executed and 
acknowledged or proved." The burden of proof on the party 
asserting transmutation is a high one, as the Idaho Court of 
Appeals described in Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 222 
657 P.2d 1083, 1090 (Ct. App. 1983): 
[W]here it is asserted ... that a spouse intended to transmute 
property or to make a gift, the burden is on the party urging 
the assertion to prove the intent in question by clear and 
convincing evidence. [citations omitted]. Concomitantly, 
because the question of whether a "clear and convincing" 
burden of proof has been met is a question for the trier of 
facts to decide in the first instance, the determination of the 
trial judge - that a claim was not shown by clear and 
convincing evidence - is entitled to great weight on appeal. 
[citations omitted]. 
In applying Idaho Code§ 32-917 to the evidence presented 
at trial, the magistrate made the following findings and 
conclusions regarding Elizabeth's claim that Reed's 
quitclaim deed transmuted his separate property into 
community property: 
Here, the parties offered conflicting evidence of the intent 
behind the quitclaims deeds. Elizabeth testified that Reed 
asked her to sign a quitclaim deed to facilitate the financing 
and that she refused to sign until Reed agreed to sign a 
deed conveying the property to her and Reed. Reed denied 
that allegation. He testified he signed the quitclaim deed 
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simply because the lender presented it to him during the 
loan closing, that he signed it along with many other papers 
the lender presented to him, and that he had no intent to 
transmute his property into community property. Reed 
notes that he alone signed the promissory note for the new 
loan. Under these circumstances, the court finds that 
Elizabeth has not proved a transmutation by clear and 
convincing evidence. The evidence did not establish that 
Reed intended to make a gift to the community." 
Hoskinson, 139 Idaho at 459-460. 
In another case involving a deed, the Court in Bowman stated: 
"In actions of this kind, the trial court-"* * *, upon proper 
averments and under the express provisions of those 
sections of the Civil Code (sections 82-148) regulating 
actions for divorce, is invested with full power to determine 
the status of the property of both or each of the spouses, 
regardless of the name of either in which the title to such 
property stands, and the recitals of whatever transfers there 
may have been between such spouses regarding such 
properties or in transfers thereof to the one or other of them, 
are merely prima facie evidence of ownership, and raise only 
disputable presumptions as to whether such properties are 
the separate or community property of the parties to such 
transfers. 
The crucial question in determining the status of the property 
was the source of funds which went into the purchase of the 
property, and the court has found upon this conflicting 
evidence from which different inferences could be drawn, 
that it was purchased with community funds." 
Bowman v. Bowman, 72 Idaho 266, 270 (1952). (citations 
omitted) 
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I. The Spouses Reached an Agreement Supporting the Husband's 
Contention the Subject Property is Separate Property. 
Even the fact that Husband allowed the receipt of a deed that mentions 
Wife's name has been explained. The Husband repeatedly and consistently 
testified that the spouses had an informal agreement that he would purchase the 
Subject Property and that Wife would eventually use her separate funds to build 
a residence. (Tr. pp. 41-42; p. 47 L. 4; p. 48 L. 22-24; p. 49 L. 1-6; p. 52 L. 24 - p. 
53 L. 17; p.130 L. 16 - p.131 L. 8; p. 155 L. 3-6). This agreement would have the 
spouses equal partners in the final project combining land and residence, once 
Wife made her contribution. 
Wife offers no evidence disputing the agreement, just a mere denial (Tr. p. 
135, L. 2). 
The Magistrate in this matter found that Husband and Wife: 
"had an express verbal agreement that when [wife] sold her 
separate Florida home, she would kick in an equal amount of 
money, such to the point that where they would build a 
house on this property that when the house, this marital 
dream house, if you will, was finished and the property was 
just the way they wanted it, they wanted it, they each would 
have kicked in an equal amount of their own separate 
proceeds and then they don't have to carry separate claims 
because everybody's in it 50/50. Dollar for dollar, and it's a 
true community asset at that point. 
Miss Kraly denies that such an agreement was made; 
however, in her opportunity to testify in terms of why she 
believed that [husband] did in fact intend a gift of this large 
amount of money, the $168,000, his half, there was never 
anything in the evidence, other than her subjective belief or 
conclusion that a gift had been intended." 
(Tr. p. 178, L. 23- p. 179, L.15). (emphasis added). 
In this case, Wife failed to honor her portion of the bargain. 
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J. The Parol Evidence Rule Does Not Prevent Husband From 
Demonstrating The Property Was Acquired With His Separate 
Property. 
One major argument by Wife is her contention that the parol evidence rule 
bars Husband's claim that the Subject Property is Husband's separate property. 
Wife mis-characterizes the effect and purpose of the rule. 
1. The Deed is Not an Unambiguous Statement. 
The warranty deed at hand makes no mention of the character of the 
Subject Property. It does not state that it is community property. The fact that 
the deed is to "Husband and Wife" is not an unambiguous statement as to 
character of the Subject Property because the deed makes no expression as to 
the character. The deed in question is not clear and unequivocal evidence of an 
agreement between Husband and Wife. The deed is from third party grantors 
who cannot characterize property contrary to Idaho law. Secondly, The deed 
states it was delivered for "Value Received". Husband contends that the parol 
evidence rule would not have been applicable at the trial of this matter to prevent 
Husband from presenting evidence regarding two issues: (1) the true 
consideration paid; and (2) evidence demonstrating the character of the Subject 
Property as his sole and separate property pursuant to I. C. 32-903. 
Wife cites several cases in support of her contention that the parol 
evidence rule requires this court to hold that the real property is the community 
property of the parties. 
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In Hall v. Hall, 112 Idaho 641 (Ct. App. 1987), the deed in question stated 
in its consideration clause "For Value Received". This is an ambiguous 
statement. Therefore "parol evidence is admissible to show the true 
consideration for the conveyance". Hall, 112 Idaho at 642. In Hall, the 
consideration clause stated "For Value Received" exactly as in the instant case. 
Hall, 112 Idaho at 642. Therefore, in the case at hand, the consideration clause 
is not an unambiguous statement, and is subject to the Husband's parol evidence 
to explain the actual source of the considerations paid, namely his $167,500.00 
of separate funds. In the case at hand, the true consideration has been proven 
by admissible tracing evidence to be the separate property of the Husband. 
In Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483 (1989) the Court held that the granter who 
sells property to a husband and wife for valuable consideration cannot testify that 
the conveyance was part gift and part sale. This is the application of the parol 
evidence rule that prohibits granters from presenting evidence that a grantee 
received something different than demonstrated in the deed. Hall does not 
suggest that a grantee will be unable to demonstrate the nature and source of 
funds used to acquire property. Hall does not overrule J.C. 32-903, Cargill v. 
Hancock, 92 Idaho 460 (1968), or the long line of cases that hold the character of 
property is determined by the source of funds used to acquire the property, not 
the method by which title is held. Estate of Freeburn, 97 Idaho 845 (1976), 
(1983) Lang v. Lang, 109 Idaho 802 (Ct. App. 1985). Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 
811,813 (1983) 
In Bliss v Bliss, 127 Idaho 170 (1995), the husband conveyed real 
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property to his wife by quitclaim deed. The deed included language that the 
conveyance was to her as "her separate property" and that the conveyance was 
for "valuable consideration". The court noted that the wife was entitled to the 
presumption set forth in Idaho Code§ 32-906(2) and stated: 
"Here, not only did Gordon "convey" the property to 
Althea, thereby raising the presumption of 
separateness under I.C. § 32-906(2) , the deed 
expressly states the land is conveyed "as her separate 
property." Further, the deed unambiguously declares 
that it is "in consideration of ONE DOLLA.R and 
OTHER GOOD and VALUABLE CONSIDERATION." 
Gordon's extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to 
contradict these clear statements. Hall, 116 Idaho at 
484, 777 P.2d at 256. Thus, the evidence offered to 
rebut the statutory presumption of I.C. § 32-906(2) was 
legally insufficient." 
Bliss v Bliss, 127 Idaho at 174, 175. 
The facts of the Bliss case present an unambiguoug fact pattern in 
distinction to the case at hand 
Although the deed to the Subject Property is to "Husband and Wife" the 
deed is not from Husband to wife and does not raise any presumptions under 
Idaho Code§ 32-906(2). Even if the parol evidence rule were applicable, nothing 
in the deed is contradicted by application of Idaho Code § 32-903 and the cases 
cited above. 
2. Husband Did Not Present Contradictory Evidence. 
Husband contends that the parol evidence rule is not applicable because 
this is not a case where the granter is being asked to contradict the terms or 
statements in the deed. The Bliss Court, in reviewing the history of the parol 
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evidence rule, stated: 
"As we understand the statute [of frauds] above quoted, it 
was intended to prevent just such a class of proof and to 
preclude the possibility of titles becoming subject to the 
capricious memories of interested witnesses. The statute 
was enacted to guard against the frailties of human memory 
and the temptations to litigants and their friendly witnesses 
to testify to facts and circumstances which never happened. 
Experience had convinced both jurists and lawmakers that 
the only safe way to preserve and pass title to real property 
is by a written conveyance subscribed by the granter. The 
beneficial effects of this statute would be destroyed if a 
granter could come in years afterwards and submit oral 
testimony to show that the conveyance was not intended as 
an absolute grant but was only intended to create a 
trusteeship in the grantee." 
Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,175, citing Dunn v. Dunn, 59 
Idaho 473, 484, 83 P.2d 471, 475-76 (1938). 
In this case, Husband does not seek to introduce evidence from the 
granter that contradicts the plain language of the deed. Unlike Bliss, the deed 
makes no attempt to set forth the character of the Subject Property. Husband 
only seeks to have the court consider the un-contradicted evidence that the 
Subject Property was acquired with Husband's separate funds pursuant to I.C. 
32-903 and is therefore his separate property. 
3. The Paro! Evidence Rule was Untimely Raised and Therefore 
Waived. 
During the Trial Husband testified as to the source of funds to purchase 
the Subject Property, the agreement of the parties to eventually improve the 
Subject Property with Wife's funds, and the tracing of his separate funds. The 
Wife interposed no trial objections to the testimony of the Husband. 
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While it may be true that Hall v. Hall, and the Paro! Evidence Rule might 
be the basis for a timely trial objection, in this matter no such objections were 
interposed. Because no objection was interposed, the trial court in this case 
received the evidence and it is properly part of the record for Appeal. 
In Hall v. Hall, 116 Idaho 483 (1989) timely trial objections were made to 
the introduction of evidence, but the objections were overruled by the trial court. 
The objections were the grounds for the appeal. The Court ruled that this type of 
evidence is inadmissible over an objection timely placed during trial. 
However, in this case, no such trial objections were raised. Relying upon 
the Paro! Evidence Rule is inappropriate at the Appellate level if not raised at 
trial. The trier of fact must apply the Paro! Evidence Rule to evidence and 
objections when presented. The reason this issue is not properly before the 
Court is that the Paro! Evidence Rule is not a rule of evidence but it is merely a 
rule of construction of contracts that has been applied to deeds. Hall, 112 Idaho 
at 643. 
Therefore, the appellate record has properly admitted evidence to 
determine the crucial questions: (1) When the inception of title occurred? (2) 
What is the source of the funds to acquire the Subject Property? (3) Whether 
receipt of the Warranty Deed was an expression of an agreement between the 
Wife and Husband? and (4) Whether Husband gifted or transmuted the Subject 
Property to the community? 
The credible and un-controverted evidence admitted in this trial answers 
these questions in favor of the Husband/Respondent. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Subject Property is Husband's separate property pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 32-903. The character of property acquired during the marriage is 
determined by the source of the proceeds used for the acquisition. The Subject 
Property was entirely acquired with the separate funds of the Husband. The 
funds used to acquire the Subject Property were obtained through the sa!e of the 
real property owned by Husband prior to his marriage to Wife. The tracing of the 
separate funds was complete and sufficient. 
Because Wife has not disputed the source of funds used to acquire the 
Subject Property, the Court must affirm the Magistrate's finding that $167,500 of 
Husband's separate property proceeds was the sole source used to acquire the 
Subject Property. Husband has overcome the presumption of community 
property and the Deed recorded on the Subject Property does not alter the 
character of the Subject Property. 
DATED tt,;, ~ay of J,ly, 2008. ~ 
ERIK P. ~Respondent 
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